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Introduction:  The scientific success of any future 
human lunar exploration mission will be strongly de-
pendent on design of both the systems and operations 
practices that underpin crew operations on the lunar 
surface. Inept surface mission preparation and design 
will either ensure poor science return, or will make 
achieving quality science operation unacceptably diffi-
cult for the crew and the mission operations and sci-
ence teams. In particular, ensuring a robust system for 
managing real-time science information flow during 
surface operations, and ensuring the crews receive ex-
tensive field training in geological sciences, are as crit-
ical to mission success as reliable spacecraft and a 
competent operations team. 
Apollo: The scientific success of the Apollo J-
missions rested in part on the strong relationship be-
tween the crewmembers, the scientists involved in 
planning the mission and training the crew, the mission 
operators and NASA management. This team was re-
sponsible for integrating science objectives into the 
landing site selection, flight and surface science opera-
tions development, crew geologic training, and the 
mission management practices that allowed the crew to 
rove significant distances from the LM with the skills 
to perform as competent scientific explorers. Pertinent 
examples include the willingness of the mission de-
signers on Apollo 17 to fit the landing site ellipse into 
the Taurus-Littrow Valley, writing mission rules to 
allow roving distances of up to 10 km, and providing 
>1000 hours of scientific training (including >500 
hours of geologic field training) to the J-mission crews.  
Even when the projected site geology turned out to be 
radically different from what was expected (e.g., dur-
ing Apollo 16), the crewmembers’ training enabled 
them to recover from the unexpected findings and pro-
duce scientifically competent field observations and 
samples that changed our view of the Moon. 
Desert RATS:  Since 1997, JSC has conducted ex-
tensive field testing of EVA systems, prototype un-
pressurized and pressurized rovers, habitats, infor-
mation systems and mission operations approaches, 
including extensive science operations teams. The ma-
jority of this testing has been carried out in the San 
Francisco Volcanic Field near Flagstaff, AZ. The com-
plexity of the missions tested has increased from 2 
researches and 1 test subject (1997) to well over 200 
team members and 17 different teams (2010) [1]. The 
most extensive RATS exercise was in 2010, where the 
team simulated a 24-7, two-week long traverse on the 
lunar surface using 2 pressurized rovers, 4 crewmem-
bers and an extensive science operations team with 2 
tactical science teams and a single strategic science 
operations team. The critical lessons learned include 1) 
a well-trained crew, patterned after the Apollo 17 
model of 1 pilot/engineer and 1 geologist, can conduct 
cutting edge geologic research on the lunar surface, 
provided they have the mobility systems to safely 
range 10s of km from a landing site and the operations 
practices to allow wide ranging exploration; 2) the 
volume science data coming out of this kind of mission 
is extensive and can swamp the ability of a science 
operations team to assimilate and evaluate the data and 
manage crew science operations in a given 24 hour 
period; 3) crew interaction with ground science teams 
can be extremely cumbersome unless all parties in-
volve recognize that the ground science team is the 
“brain trust” that helps the crew understand science 
results and can assist the crew’s science operations by 
doing science planning; and 4) managing long-duration 
(probably >5 days) human planetary exploration in a 
manner similar to Apollo is probably not workable in 
terms of cost, stress, fatigue and morale [2], [3], [4], 
[5]. 
Future Surface Operations Recommendations: 
1) we are well along to having the appropriate EVA 
and rover systems to enable extensive science explora-
tion of the Moon. Although developments need to be 
made in building new hardware and scaling up test 
approaches from low TRL levels to flight readiness, 
the engineering community has made great strides in 
getting these systems ready; 2) the spaceflight commu-
nity needs to realize that extensive (>1000 hours) field-
based, not computer-based, scientific training of future 
lunar crews is the key to scientific success, without 
which all the engineering accomplishments comes to 
naught; 3) we need extensive work on IT systems to 
manage the volume of science information (HD 
still/video, voice), including the ability to turn verbal 
crew science observations into “skimmable” written 
transcripts, so science data can be useful to science 
mission planners immediately, not months after the 
surface mission is over. 
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